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"We hold that upon proof of the facts pleaded by plaintiffs the court could properly find that plaintiffs were the
employers of the packing house labor; that not less than 80
per cent of the packing house services were incidental to
ordinary farming operations as distinguished from commercial
operations, and hence were agricultural, and could properly
conclude therefrom that all the wages paid were tax exempt.''
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the judgment
and permit the defendants to answer if they be so advised.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 7,
1954. Carter, .J., and Schauer, .J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

[S. F. No. 18781.

In Bank.

Mar. 12, 1954.]

DION R. HOLM, City Attorney, etc., et al., Petitioners, v.
SUPEHIOR COUHT FOH THE CITY AND COUNTY
OF SAN FHANCISCO, Respondent; WYNONA BELL,
Real Party in Interest.
[1] Appeal- Orders Appealable:

Discovery- Prohibition.-An
order granting inspection of documents under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1000, is not appealable, and prohibition is proper remedy to
restrain its enforcement.
[2] Discovery-Bill of Discovery.-Formerly there was no right
in equity to inspect an adversary's documentary evidence.
[3] !d.-Discovery Under Code.-While Code Civ. Proc., § 1000,
relating to inspection of writings, is based on bill of discovery
in chancery courts, the former equitable rule against inspection
of documentary evidence does not establish a limitation on
scope of code section.
[4] !d.-Discovery Under Code.-Where use of statutorv bill of
discovery is denied by our courts it usually is be~ause in-

[3] See Cal.Jur., Discovery and Inspection, § 3; Am.Jur., Discovery and Inspection, § 8 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 34; Discover},
§ 7; [2] Discovery,§ 1; [3-9, 17, 18] Discovery,§ 2; [10]. Witnesses,
§ 74; [11, 13] Witnesses, § 76(2); [12] Witnesses, § 76(1); rJ4,
19-21] Witnesses, § 76(3); [15, 16] Witnesses, § 77; [22] Witnesses, § 74,.
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formation sought to be obtained is not relevant or material
to issues in case.
[5] !d.-Discovery Under Code.-Documents sought to be inspected
under statutory bill of discovery must be properly identified
and admissible in evidence at ensuing trial.
[6) !d.-Discovery Under Code.-The trend of judicial decisions
is to relax rules which relate to. taking of evidence by ancillary
proceeC!_ings, of which inspection of documents is one method,
and provisions of Code Civ. Proc., § 1000, are remedial in
nature and should be liberally construed.
[7] !d.-Discovery Under Code.-Provision in Code Ci v. Proc.,
§ 1000, declaring that when an adversary refuses to comply
with order of inspection the court "may exclude the entries of
accounts of the book, or the document, or paper from being
given in evidence," could apply only to documents in support
of adversary's own case.
[8] !d.-Discovery Under Code-Documents Subject to Inspection.
-In action by bus passenger against city and bus driver for
personal injuries, a document containing signed statement
made by passenger to claims investigator of municipal railway
concerning facts of accident, written reports by driver to city
setting forth his version of accident, and photographs taken
at scene of and following accident by agents of city are material
and relevant to questions in issue, would be admissible in
evidence, and are within scope of Code Civ. Proc., § 1000,
subject to their confidential nature.
[9) !d.-Discovery Under Code-Privileged Matters.-Where right
to assert attorney-client privilege as set forth in Code Civ.
Proc., § 1881, subd. 2, is clear, the statutory bill of discovery
<'annot be used to defeat it.
[10] Witnesses-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.
--The objective of making a particular communication privileged is to encourage a client to make complete disclosure to
his attorney without fear that others may also be informed.
[11] !d.-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-The
attorney-client privilege attaches where communication is made
in confidence pursuant to a client-attorney relationship with
respect to particular matter.
[121 Id.- Privileged Communications- Attorney and Client.There is no attorney-client privilege in a communication which
is not made to or for further communication to an attorney,
although communication might have some connection with
possible liability in future, such as reports submitted in regular course of business for study in accident prevention.

[10] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 36 et seq.; Am.Jur., Witnesses,
§ 460 et seq.
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[13] !d.-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-The
attorney-client privilege does not attach to a communication
not intended to be of a confidential nature.
[14] !d.-Privileged Communications- Attorney and Client.-To
make communication from client privileged the dominant purpose must be for transmittal to attorney "in the course of
professional employment." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. (2).)
[15] !d.-Privileged Communications- Attorney and Client.-In
any given situation it is necessary that a determination be
made concerning facts asserted as basis for attorney-client
privilege, and this determination is for trial court in first instance.
[16] !d.-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-If it
appears that communication from client is to serve a dual
purpose, one for transmittal to attorney "in the course of professional employment" and one not related to that purpose,
the question presented to trial court is as to which purpose
predominates, and question then is whether conclusion of trial
court on facts is correct or has resulted in abuse of discretion.
[17] Discovery-Discovery Under Code-Privileged Matters.-In
action by bus passenger against city and bus driver for personal injuries, a document containing signed statement made
by passenger to claims investigator of municipal railway concerning facts of accident, and which was made in an "arm's
length" conversation and transmitted to her adversaries' attorneys, is not a privileged communication between attorney
and client, there being no attorney-client relationship, and
document may therefore properly be reached under Code Civ.
Proc., § 1000, relating to inspection of writings.
[18] !d.-Discovery Under Code-Privileged Matters.-In action
by bus passenger against city and bus driver for personal
injuries, written reports by driver to city setting forth his
version of accident and photographs taken at scene of and
following accident by agents of city fall within attorney-client
privilege, both having originated with agents of city and having been forwarded to defendants' attorneys for use in possible
litigation, and hence inspection of such documents by plaintiff
should be denied on ground of such privilege.
.
[19] Witnesses-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.
-Where a communication is between corporate employees and
is embodied in reports or photographic evidence for purpose
of redelivery to a corporate attorney, the attorney-client privilege attaches if reports and photographs were created as a
means of communicating confidential information to attorney.
[20] Id.- Privileged Communications- Attorney and Client.There is no valid basis for distinction between a client's communication for transmittal to attorney to prepare for threat-
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ened litigation following particular accident, and a communication prepared for identical purpose under standing rules in
case of all accidents involving personal or property injury;
the attorney-client privilege can attach in either instance in
a proper case.
[21] !d.-Privileged Communications- Attorney and Client.-In
action by bus passenger against city and bus driver for personal
injuries, it is of considerable importance to obtain all information available at scene of accident to safeguard rights
of city, and in view of imminent possibility that city would be
faced with a claim involving substantial liability for personal
injuries far exceeding financial considerations in any other
respect, it is unreasonable and unrealistic to say that communication of documentary information to attorneys for use
in their professional capacity was not foremost and predominantly in minds of those securing and transmitting such
information.
[22] !d.-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-The
attorney-client privilege is an important element in effectiveness with which counselor-at-law is to advise his client and
safeguard the latter's interests, and where right to privilege
is clearly established it should not be cast aside; the fact that
information contained in communications might also be used
for incidental purposes not entitled to the privilege is unimportant.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing an order of inspection granted under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1000. Writ granted in part and denied in part.
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney (San Francisco) and Donald
J. Kropp, Deputy City Attorney, for Petitioners.
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon and Roy Bronson as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Shirley, Saroyan, Calvert & Barbagelata and J. Francis
Shirley for Real Party in Interest.
SHENK, J.-The petitioners seek a writ of prohibition to
restrain the respondent court from enforcing its order for
the inspection of certain documents in their possession. An
alternative writ was issued.
The order was made in an action in which Wynona Bell,
referred to as the plaintiff, seeks to recover damages from the
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petitioners Raymond Gnecco and the city and county of
San Francisco for personal injuries alleged to have been
suffered by her due to the alleged negligent operation by
Gnecco, an employee of the city's municipal railway, of a bus
on which she was a passenger. The petitioners Dion H.
Holm and Donald ,J. Kropp are attorneys at law who at all
times involved represented the city and county. They are also
the lega~ representatives of Gnecco as an employee of the city
and county in the action for damages. Before trial in that
action the plaintiff moved under section 1000 of the Code of
Civil Procedure for an order permitting her to inspect, among
other things, (1) a document containing a signed statement
made by her to a claims investigator of the municipal railway concerning the facts of the accident; (2), written reports
by Gnecco to the city setting forth his version of the accident,
and (3) photographs taken at the scene of and following the
accident by agents of the city.
'l'he pertinent parts of section 1000 provide : ''Any cot1rt
in which an action is pending, or a judge or justice thereof
may, upon notice, order either party to give to the other,
within a specified time, an inspection and copy or permission
to take a copy, of entries of accounts in any book, or of any
document or paper in his possession, or under his control,
·containing evidence relating to the merits of the action, or
the defense therein . . . "
In support of the motion for the order of inspection it was
stated in affidavits on behalf of the plaintiff that she had
signed a written statement setting forth factual information
material to the controversy, the contents of which she could
not remember and a copy of which had not been furnished
her. It was stated in an af-fidavit of the plaintiff's counsel
that the documents involved were recorded and preserved
in the "regular course of business of defendants
the operation of the Municipal Railway." It is claimed that a
deposition of the petitioner Gnecco, not made a part of the
record here, also contains evidence that the reports were filed
in the regular course of business. There is no further reference to the purpose of the documents in the complaint. the
notice of motion, other supporting af-fidavits or in any other
documents which are a part of the plaintiff's record. The
deputy city attorney and the general claims agent for the
Municipal Hailway, in af-fidavits filed on behalf of the petitioners, stated that the questioned documents had been kept
in confidence in the possession or control of one of them sl.nce

in

Mar.~1954]

HoL:M:

v.

SuPERIOR CouRT

505

[42 C.2d 500; 267 P.2d 1025]

they were made; that they were in the possession of the
attorney at the time of the demand for their production;
that they were secured and kept in confidence for use by
the attorneys for information and aid in defending in any
litigation arising out of the accident, and that the documents
are protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The foregoing was the only evidence before the court.
The motion was granted as to the documents involved, and
the court ordered the petitioners to produce them. Thereafter a motion to vacate the order was denied. The petitioners refused to comply with the order asserting that the
court lacked jurisdiction to make it. The court threatens
to enforce its order by contempt proceedings and the petitioners seek to restrain its enforcement by this application
for the writ of prohibition.
[1] The order is not appealable and prohibition is the
proper remedy. (City&:: County of San Francisco v. Superior
Court, 38 Cal.2d 156 [238 P.2d 581] ; Franchise Tax Board
v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d 538 [225 P.2d 905].)
The petitioners' main contentions are that the attorneyclient privilege (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. (2)) bars inspection of the papers; that section 1000 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is no broader than the historical bill of discovery in
equity, and that by reason of the limitations of the latter, the
documents may not be inspected.
[2] In regard to the latter contention it is true that
there formerly was no right in equity to inspect an adversary's
documentary evidence. (6 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d ed., 1940,
§ 1857, p. 443.) [3] However, while the cases hold that
section 1000 is based upon the bill of discovery in chancery
courts (Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.2d 449
[81 P.2d 150, 118 A.L.R. 259]; Wright v. Superior Court,
139 Cal. 469 [73 P. 145] ), they do not hold that the equitable
rule establishes a limitation on the scope of our code section.
[4] Where the use of the statutory bill of discovery is denied
by our courts it usually is because the information sought
to be obtained is not relevant or material to any of the issues
in the case. (Union Collection Co. v. Snperior Court, 149
Cal. 790 [87 P. 1035] ; Ex parte Clarke, 126 Cal. 235 [58
P. 546, 77 Am.St.Rep. 176, 46 hRA. 835] .) [5] ft has
been said that the documents also must be properly idrntified
and admissible in evidence at the ensuing trial. (McClatchy
Newspapers v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.2d 386 [159 P.2d 944].)
But none of the cases hold that section 1000 is to be construed
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as narrowly as the petitioners contend. [6] On the contrary, in Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.2d
449, this court stated at page 462: "That the trend of judicial
decisions is to relax the rules which relate to the taking of
evidence by ancillary proceedings of which the inspection
of documents is one method. . . . " It further quoted from
Corpus Juris, volume 18, page 116, to the effect that provisions such as section 1000 are '' remediill in their nature and
should be liberally construed." (See also Austin v. Turrentine, 30 Cal.App.2d 750 [87 P.2d 72, 88 P.2d 178] .)
[7] Section 1000 provides in part that when an adversary
refuses to comply with an order of inspection, the court "may
exclude the entries of accounts of the book, or the document,
or paper from being given in evidence. . .. " It is apparent
that this could apply only to documents in support of the
adversary's own case. It has been said, without discussion
of the point here involved, that inspection was proper in
a case where account books bore evidence of the adversary's
own case. (Avery v. Wiltsee, 177 Cal. 484, 488 [171 P. 95] ;
see also Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749
[235 P.2d 833]; Demaree v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 99
[73 P.2d 605].)
[8] There is no question but that the documents here
sought to be inspected are material and relevant to questions
in issue, would be admissible in evidence, and are within
the scope of section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
subject to their confidential nature.
The right to maintain the security of a confidential communication under the attorney-client privilege is set forth
in section 1881 of the Code of Civil Procedure which states
in part: ''There are particular relations in which it is the
policy of the law to encourage confidence. and to preserve
it inviolate; therefore, a person can not be examined as a
witness in the following cases . . . 2. Attorney and Client.
An attorney can not, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to
him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment .... " (See also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd.
(e).) [9] Where the right to assert the privilege is clear it
should follow that the bill of discovery cannot be used to defeat it.
[10] The objective of making a particular communication
privileged is to encourage a client to make a complete dis-
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closure to his attorney without fear that others may also be
informed. (City & County of San Francisco v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal.2d 227, 235 [231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418] ;
8 Wigmore, Evidence, supra, § 2380a, p. 813.) [11] The
privilege attaches where the communication is made in confidence pursuant to a client-attorney relationship with respect
to the particular matter. (McKnew v. Superior Court, 23
Cal.2d 58, 65-66 [142 P.2d 1].) [12] Thus there would
seem to be no privilege in a communication which is not made
to or for further communication to an attorney, although the
communication might have some connection with possible
liability in the future, such as reports submitted in the regular
course of business for study in accident prevention. [13] Nor
does the privilege attach to a communication not intended to
be of a confidential nature. (City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d 227, 234-235; MeKnew v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.2d 58, 66.) [14] To
make the communication privileged the dominant purpose
must be for transmittal to an attorney ''in the course of professional employment." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. (2) ;
City &; County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, supra,
37 Cal.2d 227, 235.)
[15] In any given situation it is necessary that a determination be made concerning the facts asserted as a basis
for the privilege. This determination is for the trial court
in the first instance. Where it is clear that the communication
has but a single purpose, there is little difficulty in concludii\g
that the privilege should be applied or withheld accordingly.
[16] If it appears that the communication is to serve a
dual purpose, one for transmittal to an attorney ''in the course
of professional employment" and one not related to that
purpose, the question presented to the trial court is as to
which purpose predominates. The question then is whether
the conclusion of the trial court on the facts is correct or
has resulted in an abuse of discretion.
[17] In the present case the plaintiff's statement to the
city's claims investigator was recorded as she made it. After
being transcribed she signed her name to the document. Her
assertions that she was not given a copy of the statement
and that she does not remember what she said are not disputed. She does not seek to have disclosed any communication from her adversaries to their attorneys. She merely
seeks the record of a communication which she herself made
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in an '' <lrm 's length'' conversation and which was transmitted
to her adversarie,;' attorneys. Clearly as to the document
em bodying this communication there is no attorney-client
relationship, the commtmication was not made nor intended
to be iu eonfictrnce, and the privilege. did not attach. Accordingly the documf'nt (·l1n properly he reaehed nnder the statu1ory provisions.
[18] As to the reports and photographs it is clear that
from their character and content they fall within the privilege.
Both originated with agents of the city and it is undisputed
that they were forwarded in confidence to the defendants'
attorneys for use in possible litigation. It is stated in City
& County of San F'ranc·isco v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.
2d 227 at page 235: ''The privilege embraces not only oral
or written statements but actions, signs, or other means of
communicating information by a client to his attorney.''
And at page 236-237: "It is no less the client's communication to the attorney when it is given by the client to an agent
for transmission to the attorney, and it is immaterial whether
the agent is the agent of the attorney, the client, or both.
'[T]he client's freedom of communication requires a liberty
of employing other means than his own personal action. The
privilege of confidence would be a vain one unless its exereise could be thus delegated. A communication, then, by any
form of agency employed or set in motion by the client is
within the privilege . . . ( 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2317, pp.
616-617 . . . . ) " [19] It follows that where the communication is between corporate employees and is embodied in
reports or photographic evidence for the purpose of redelivery
to a corporate attorney the privilege attaches if the reports
and photographs were ereated as a means of communicating
confidential information to the attorney.
The present proceeding calls for the determination of the
dominant purpose for which the reports and photographs
·were created. As previously stated, the affidavits of the petitioners in the trial court revealed that the documents were
prepared as confidential communications to the city attorney
in threat of litigation and that the documents had at all times
been treated as such. These affidavits were uncontradicted
as to the purpose of the documents. In this connection the
plaintiff asserts only that they were prepared in the regular
eourse of business. [20] But there is no valid basis for a
distinction between a communication created for transmittal
to an attorney to prepare for threatened litigation following
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particular accidents, and a communication prepared for an
identical purpose under standing rules in the case of all
accidents involving personal or property injury. Because
the scope of the operations of the defendant city's municipal
railway is such as to require communications of this nature
as a routine matter, it cannot be said that the attorney-client
priVilege did not attach.
[21] In any action for damages such as the pending one
it is of considerable importance to obtain all information
available at the scene of the accident in order to safeguard
the rights of the party likely to be charged with negligence.
It is because of this fact that diligence is required in behalf
of such party to avoid or prepare for litigation·. In view of
the imminent possibility that the city would be faced with
a claim involving substantial liability for personal injuries
far exceeding financial considerations in any other respect,
it is unreasonable and unrealistic to say that the communication of the documentary information to the attorneys for use
in their professional capacity was not foremost and predominately in the minds of those securing and transmitting the
same.
The court did not make specific findings of fact upon
which its order for the production of the documents was
based. However, in view of the undisputed evidence both
as to the intended purpose and the actual practice followed
any determination which would not accord greater importance
to the purpose of communications to the attorneys in their
professional capacities than to any other purpose would be
an abuse of discretion. [22] The attorney-client privilege
is an important element in the effectiveness with which the
counselor-at-law is to advise his client and safeguard the
latter's interests. Where, as here, the right to the privilege
is clearly established it should not be cast aside. The fact
that the information contained in the communications might
also be used for incidental purposes not entitled to the privilege
is unimportant.
The question of the application of section 1000 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as affecting the attorney-client privilege appears not to have been decided by any California court.
However, in an analogous situation in New York Cas. Co. v.
S1tper1:or Co1trt, 30 Cal.App.2d 130 [85 P.2d 965], it was
sought to perpetuate evidence under sections 2083-2086 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The court held that confidential
reports of an accident procured for the use of an insurance
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company's attorney were protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Section 1000 was not referred to but the court cited
with approval two Ohio decisions that dealt with discovery
procedures. (In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187 [5 N.E.2d
492, 108 A.L.;R. 505] ; Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1 [77
N.E. 276, 6 L.R.A.N.S. 325] .) Those cases dealt with an
effort to obtain by subpoena duces tecttm reports of an accident prepared by an insured for its immrer and insurer's
attorneys. The Ohio court held the communications to the
insurer to be privileged.
Numerous decisions in other states have held that where
confidential reports were submitted by agents of a corporation
for transmittal to the corporate attorney, the privilege attached as against proceedings for discovery. (See cases
compiled in 146 A.L.R. at 988.) In many of the cases it
was emphasized that the crucial question is the purpose for
which the communication originated. In Cully v. Northern P.
R. Co., 35 Wash. 241 [77 P. 202], the court held that routine
correspondence, reports and documents relating to the accidental injury of the plaintiff were privileged, the court stating:' 'We can conceive of no reason why a different rule should
apply in this case than prevails in the case of privileged
commup.ications generally.''
It is concluded that the confidential communications embodied in the reports and photographs are protected by the
attorney-client privilege. As to those documents the peremptory writ is granted; as to the document containing the signed
statement of the plaintiff to the defendant's investigator, the
writ is denied. The alternative writ is discharged.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-The primary
object of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage the
client to make a full disclosure of all the facts to his attorney.
To achieve this object it is proper that the client should be
allowed to employ whatever means of communication are
necessary accurately to inform his attorney of the facts. (City
& County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d
227, 235-237 [231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418], and cases and
authorities cited.) Accordingly, the privilege is not lost if
the client casts his communication in the form of reports
compiled by him or his agents for that purpose. Moreover,
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in this respect there is no logical difference between an oral
or written report of what the client or his agent saw and a
photograph taken for the purpose of communicating the
scene to the attorney. On the other hand, a document, report,
or photograph that would otherwise be admissible in evidence
does not become privileged merely because the client delivers
it to his attorney. Unless a report or photograph is created
for the purpose of communicating information to the attorney,
it cannot have the character of a privileged communication
when it comes into existence and accordingly cannot become
privileged if it is later delivered to the attorney. (See 8 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.], § 2307, p. 594.)
No problem is presented if it is clear that the only purpose
of preparing a report is to communicate it to the attorney.
In many situations, however, reports will be made for other
purposes as well. The question arises, therefore, whether the
existence of purposes for preparing reports in addition to
that of communicating with the attorney will defeat the
privilege. This question may only be answered by evaluating
the relative importance of the purposes present in the light
of the object of the privilege, bearing in mind that it ''is
strictly construed, since it suppresses relevant facts that may
be necessary for a just decision." (City & County of San
Francisco v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d 227, 234.)
If the purposes other than that of communicating facts
to the attorney are so minor that the client would not create
reports if no communication were contemplated, the existence
of such purposes should not defeat the privilege. In such
cases to encourage full disclosure it is necessary to encourage
the creation of the reports, and accordingly, the object of
the privilege is served by making them privileged. If, on
the other hand, reasons unrelated to the seeking of legal
advice or service would cause the client to create reports,
they should not be privileged. In such cases the reports
would be created in any event, and accordingly, whether or
not they were privileged would not affect their being created.
It follows, therefore, that in any case where reports are made,
not only for the purpose of communicating to the attorney,
but for other purposes as well, the object of the privilege is
subserved only by making those reports privileged that would
not be created but for the purpose of communication.
In the present case it is true that one reason the municipal
railway secures accident reports from its employees and takes
photographs is to communicate facts to its attorney. The
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controlling question, however, is whether it would secure the
reports and take the photographs in any event. The municipal railway is in the business of transportation and is required to exereise "the utmost care and diligence" toward
its customers. ( Civ. Code, § 2100.) It is under a duty to
employ careful drivers and acquire and maintain safe equipment. When an aecident oecurs it must make an investigation of the facts, not only for the purposes of litigation that
may arise therefrom, but also to enable it to eliminate careless
drivers, maintenanee men, and dangerous and defective equipment. It would be subject to a charge of continuing negligence in the operation of its system if it did not do so. Under
these eircumstances the trial court was justified in concluding
that the accident reports and photographs would be made
regardless of the purpose of eommunicating facts to the railway's attorney, and aecordingly, they should not be privileged.
I concur in the conclusion of Mr. Justice Shenk that plaintiff's statement was not privileged.
I would deny the writ in its entirety.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The decision of the majority in this case is another step
backward in the administration of justice-the denial of the
power of a trial judge to force the adverse party to produce
competent, material evidence germane to the issues in the
ease notwithstanding a showing that the evidence had been
prepared in the ordinary course of defendant's business and
was then available.
There ean be no doubt that upon the faets stated in the
affidavits before the superior court it could conclude either
that the papers sought to be inspected were prepared for
the purpose of litigation and transmittal to the attorney for
Gnecco and the city, and hence privileged, or that they were
not; that they were prepared in the regular course of business of efTiciently operating the transportation system and
hence not privileged. It chose to believe those supporting
the latter view. I agree that the papers were properly inspectable under section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure
but that they could have been privileged if they were prepared for the purpose of transmittal to the attorney in connection with pending or threatened litigation.
As stated by the District Court of Appeal when this case
was decided by that court by unanimous decision ( Cal.App.)
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251 P .2rl 35, 36-37; "While a party is to be protected
from unnecessary disclosure to others of the contents of his
private books, papers and records, as is said in McKinley v.
Southern Pac. Co., 80 Cal.App.2d 301, 315 [181 P.2d 899],
'no party has a right to refuse to produce any report or
document which may have a bearing upon the facts of the
pending litigation.'
"Nor can it be said that any of the documents are privileged
as petitioner contends. 'l'he photographs have simply recorded what any eyewitness could have seen. The statement
of facts by the plaintiff was made to the defendant's agent.
Certainly, the relationship of client and attorney did not exist
between Wynona Bell and the city attorney. They were
dealing at arm's length. Although the report of Gnecco, the
driver, originated with him, it does not appear to have been
directed to any attorney. In fact the record does not disclose
that Gnecco had any attorney at the time the report was
made up. The report appears to be more of a statement of
facts for study in the prevention of accidents than a communication from a client to his attorney. As is stated in Wigmore on Evidence, section 2318, second edition, it is only
those documents which the pa:rty has created as a communicating client, that are privileged.
"In Construction Prod. Corp. v. Superior Court, 103 Cal.
App.2d 403, 404 [229 P.2d 399], it is said that 'In determining the propriety of an order under section 1000, Code of
Civil Procedure, it must be borne in mind that the trial
court's action thereunder is discretionary and .that all intendments are in favor of the validity of such order. Accordingly,
such action will not be annulled unless a clear abuse of that
discretion appears. (Milton Kauffman, Inc. v. Su.perior
Court, 94 Cal.App.2d 8, 16 [210 P.2d 88] .) ' The order here
made does not appear to violate any fundamental right of
the petitioner.''
There was a clear conflict in the affidavits on the question
of the purpose for which the papers were prepared. This is
apparent on their face. The affidavits of the claimants of
the privilege (the city and Gnecco) stated that the pa"Qers
were for transmittal to their attorney for use in the pending
litigation. On the other hand, plaintiff's affidavits opposing
the privilege stated that they were made in the regular course
of business of the city in operating its transportation system
and are known as "defect cards" and "defect reports," that
42 C.2d-17
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is, reports of unusual conditions or defects with respect to
the busses. The trial court resolved this conflict against the
existence of a factual basis for the privilege and this court
should not, as does the majority, reweigh the affidavits and
arrive at a contrary conclusion.
It is a settled rule that the one claiming the privilege has
the burden of establishing the facts as a basis for its application (McKnew v. St~perior Court, 23 Cal.2d 58 [142 P.2d 1];
Carroll v. Sprague, 59 Cal. 655; Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633
[22 P. 26, 131]; Collette v. Sarrasin, 184 Cal. 283 [193 P.
571]). Whether the privilege is properly available, is a
fachtal issue to be disposed of according to the principles
applicable to such questions. As said in Hager v. Shindler,
29 Cal. 47, 64: " . . . whether a communication by a client
to his attorney was made in confidence, is a question of fact,
to be disposed of on principles applicable universally to questions of that character.
"We must assume that the Court below passed upon the
point as involving a matter of fact, and found that Mastick 's
knowledge of the voluntary character of the deed was not
confidential; and we consider the finding to be well sustained
by the evidence.'' In Stewart v. Dottglass, 9 Cal.App. 712,
714 [100 P. 711], it is said: "The first assignment of error
argued by plaintiff relates to the ruling of the court admitting evidence of certain statements made by him to an attorney at law over the objection that they were privileged.
When this objection was made, and before passing upon it,
the court took the testimony of witnesses to determine whether
or not these statements were made in the course of professional employment. This was the proper procedure. The
court found that the statements were not so made. It being
within the province of the trial court to pass upon this, like
any other question of fact, and the evidence being conflicting,
the conclttsion of the trial court wiU stand as final." (Emphasis added.) In Dwelly v. McReynolds, 6 Cal.2d 128 [56
P.2d 1232], this court said at page 131: "The question of
privilege was a matter for the trial court's determination
and its decision, upon conflicting evidence, is conclusive.''
Those principles are in accord with the general rule that
where there is a conflict in affidavits on a factual issue before
the trial court that court's resolution thereof is binding on
an appellate court. (Voeltz v. Bakery etc. Union, 40 Cal.2d
382 [254 P.2d 553] ; Hale v. Bohannon, 38 Cal.2d 458 [241
P.2d 4]; Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Cal.2d 144 [173 P.2d 657];
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Gordon v. Perkins, 203 Cal. 183 [263 P. 231]; Doak v. Bruson,
152 Cal. 17 [91 P. 1001]; Brainard v. Brainard, 82 Cal.App.
2d 478 [186 P.2d 990] .)
In the face of these well-established principles the majority
holds that while regular course of business was one of the
purposes, the dominant or primary purpose was that the
papers were prepared and transmitted to the attorney to be
used in litigation. In this connection the majority opinion
states : ''As to the reports and photographs it is clear that
from their character and content they fall within the privilege. Both originated with agents of the city and it is undisputed that they were forwarded in confidence to the defendants' attorneys for use in possible litigation." This holding
disregards the settled rule that the burden of establishing the
right to the privilege rests upon the claimants and it is
the function of the trial court to determine what the dominant
purpose was. The trial court could have rejected the claimants' conclusionary statements in their affidavits that the
papers were for transmittal to the attorneys for the purpose
of litigation. In reaching its result the majority states:
"These affidavits were uncontradicted as to the purpose of
the documents. In this connection the plaintiff asserts only
th&t they were prepared in the regular course of business.
But there is no valid basis for a distinction between a communication created for transmittal to an attorney to prepare
for threatened litigation following particular accidents, and
a communication prepared for an identical purpose under
standing rules in the case of all accidents involving personal
or property injury. Because the scope of the operations of
the defendant city's Municipal Railway is such as to require
communications of this nature as a routine matter, it cannot
be said that the attorney-client privilege did not attach."
The claimant's affidavits were contradicted because it appears
from plaintiff's affidavits that Gnecco 's statement and the
photographs were prepared as a defect report in the regular
course of business and not for use in litigation, and, therefore,
not within the privilege. If it was "routine" and usual
business to have such papers, the fact that they might be
used in connection with litigation would not make them privileged. The majority holding ignores the probability that
the papers were for the purpose of more efficiently operating
the transportation system-to check on the skill of the drivers
and condition of the equipment in order that appropriate
steps could be taken to cure any deficiencies. The trial court
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could, as it did, choose that purpose as the dominant one
believing that the possibility of litigation was merely incidental and whieh might not even mature into an existing
fact. In holding to the contrary the majority again usurps
the function of the trial court by determining an issue of
fact on conflicting evidence. The majority does this by
arbitrarily disregarding the conflicting statements in the
affidavits of the respective parties and holding that the trial
court abused it~ diseretion in determining what the dominant
purpose was for the preparation of Gnecco 's report of the
accident and the taking of photographs. The majority holding in this respect is in line with the current trend of recent
decisions of this court to determine the facts contrary to
the trial court even though there is a substantial conflict in
the evidence. 1 By its holding, as a matter of law, that reports,
even though made as a routine business matter, are nevertheless privileged if later transmitted to an attorney for
threatened litigation, the majority adopts a rule clearly out
of line with the great weight of authority elsewhere. It is
stated with ample and correct citation of authority ''. . . the
great weight of authority favors the view that such a statement or report made in the ordinary course of duty and before
litigation has been commenced or threatened is not a privileged communication.'' (Emphasis added; 146 A.L.R. 977,
980.)
It has been held repeatedly that section 1000 should be
liberally construed in favor of inspection (see Union Tmst
Go. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.2d 449 [81 P.2d 150, 118 A.hR.
259] ; A1tstin v. Tttrrentine, 30 Cal.App.2d 750 [87 P.2d 72,
88 P.2d 178]; Milton J[auffrnan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 94
1
Lei pert v. Honolcl, 39 Cal.2d 462 [247 P.2d 324, 29 A.L.R.2d 1] 85];
Rose v. Melocly Lane, 39 Cal.2d 481 [247 P.2d 335]; Cary v. Wentzel,
:l9 Cal.2d 491 [247 P.2d 341]; Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Cal.2d 602 [248
P.2d 910]; Roclabau.gh v. Teku.s, 39 Cal.2d 290 [246 P.2d 633]; Hawaiian
Pineapple Co. v. Inclu.strial Ace. Com., 40 Cal.2d 656 [255 P.2d 431];
Bette1· Foocl Mkts. v. American Dist. Teleg. Co., 40 Cal.2d 179 [253 P.2d
J 0]; Atkinson v. Pacific Hire Extinguisher Co., 40 Cal.2d 192 [263
P.2d 18]; S1ttter B1ttte Canal Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 40 Cal.2d 139
[2.'i1 P.2d 97n]; kfercer-Frasrr Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com .. 40 Cal.2d.
102 [251 P.2d 9G5]; G'ill v. Hearst P11blishing Co., 40 Cal.2d 224 [253
P.2d 441]; Goodman v. Harris, 40 Cal.2d 2G4 [253 P.2d 4471; Pirkle
v. Oakdale Union etc. School Dist., 40 Cal.2d 207 [2G3 P.2d 1]; Bm·tis
v. Universal Pict?tres Co., Inc., 40 Cal.2d 823 [2Fi6 P.2d 933]; K1trlan
v. Colmnbia Broadcasting Systern, 40 Cal.2d 79!) [2G6 .P.2d 9621; Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cnl.2d 778 [2fi6 P.2d 947]; T~tmer v. Mellon, 41 Cal.
2d 4i5 r2!i7 P.2d 1G]; Barrett v. City of Clarenwnt, 41 Cal.2d 70 [256
P.2d 977]; Estate of IAngenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571 [241 P.2d 990]; Gray
v. Brin7cerhoff, 41 Cal.2d 180 [258 P.2d 834].
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Cal.App.2d 8 [210 P.2d 88) ; Parker v. Shell Oil Co., 55 Cal.
App.2d 48 [130 P.2d 158]; McClatchy Newspapers v. SttpM·ior
C01trt, 26 Cal.2d 386 [159 P.2d 944]), the same as the statutes
relating to depositions, including that of the adverse party
and his agents (Code Civ. Proc., § 2055). (Pollak v. Superior
Court, 197 Cal. 389 [240 P. 1006] ; Moran v. Superior Court,
38 Cal..App.2d 328 [100 P.2d 1096] ; Zellerbach v. S1tperior
Court, 3 Cal.App.2d 49 [39 P.2d 252] .) As stated in Un·ion
Trust Co. v. Sttperior Court, supra, 11 Cal.2d 449, 462:
''. . . the enactment of statutes relative to the remedy of
obtaining evidence by inspection was had with a view to
provide a more speedy and less expensive remedy than by
the proceedings in chancery; that they 'are remedial in their
nature and should be liberally construed.'
''That the trend of .fu.dicial decisions is to relax the rules
which relate to the taking of evidence by ancillary proceedings, of which the inspection of documents is one method,
to the end that the trial of actions may be expedited and
justice be more efficaciously and speedily administered, is
reflected in many modern decisions, some of which are here
noted.'' (!ilmphasis added.)
It has been held thereunder (Code Civ. Proc., § 1000) that
the papers sought to be inspected must be material and
admissible in evidence at the ensuing trial of the action, and
they must be properly identified; the applicant for the order
of inspection must show those things to justify an order.
(McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Oal.2d
386; Milton Kauffman, Inc. v. S1tperior Court, supra, 94 Cal.
App.2d 8; Kullman, SaTz & Co. v. Superior Cmtrt, 15 CaLApp.
276 [114 P. 589]. But" Section 1000 is remedial in character
and is to he liberally construed. The modern tendency in
the administration of justice is to relax the rules which
relate to the inspection of writings to the end that the trial
of actions may be expedited and justice be more efficaciously
and speedily administered. The statute was designed to
assist a party to an action to discover material facts even
though the writings evidencing such' facts are in the possession of the adverse party. It is a wholesome aid to the
proper administration of justice. The obtaining of inspection of writings in a case where it appears that the rights
of a party may depend upon its proper exercise, should not
be regarded • as a game' having fixed rules 'that must be
literally and punctiliously observed.' Refusal to comply with
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an order of inspection based on technical objections does
violence to the spirit and intent of the statute." (MiUon
Kauffman, Inc. v. Sttperior Court, supra, 94 Cal.App.2d 8,
15; emphasis added.) Those elements may be shown by the
pleadings in the action as well as affidavits offered by the
applicant for the order. (See Union Trust Co. v. Superior
Court s~~pra, 11 Cal.2d 449; M·ilton Kauffman, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 94 Cal.App.2d 8.)
As above mentioned the complaint in plaintiff's action
charged that the negligent operation of the bus by Gnecco, the
city's driver, caused her injuries. The city and Gnecco
answered denying the material allegations and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. The affidavits
show that Gnecco made a written report to city officials of
the accident, the basis of the action, as shown by his deposition which was taken; that the photographs of the bus and
plaintiff were taken by the city shortly after the accident;
that 11 days after the accident an agent of the city questioned
plaintiff regarding the events that transpired at the accident;
and her statements were written by the agent and she signed
this statement; that she does not remember what she said
because of her emotional and physical condition at the time
the statement was taken. While there are conclusionary
statements in the affidavits with reference to the materiality
of these papers, their relevancy is sufficiently shown. The
report of Gnecco of the accident would necessarily include
his version of the facts concerning it, the precise matters
in issue in the action. It may well be admissible, if it contains admissions against him, to prove negligence, or even
for the same purpose against the city if within the scope of
his employment. Also, it may be admissible to impeach his
testimony at the trial if there is a variance. Plainly the
photographs of the bus and the scene of the accident are
relevant and commonly used. (See 10 Cal.Jur. 860, 896;
Code Civ. Proc., § 1954.) Plaintiff's statement could be used
to refresh her memory or to impeach her if there is a variance
between it and her testimony at the trial.
It is urged, however, that under the equity bill of discovery rules, an inspection before trial cannot be had by a
party (plaintiff here) to ascertain the documentary evidence
which his opponent (petitioners here) has to support his own
case. The general rule at common law was that a party was
not entitled to ascertain before trial the tenor of his adversary's evidence. (Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.), § 1845.)
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In equity and by a bill of discovery in equity for assistance
in the law court, there was an exception authorizing the
inspection before trial of documents in the adversary's possession (ibid., §§ 1846, 1857). The limitation on that right
of inspection "was that it should include only those documents which contained the evidence of the applicant, and not
those which contained the adversary's own evidence. If, for
example, A. sued B to enforce a contract, and the instrument
was in B 's possession, A. could obtain inspection of that
instrument, but not of a release which B might also possess.
It is true that A. might sometimes be unaware of the precise
contents or even of the existence of documents evidencing his
own case but possessed by B, and to this extent the discovery
and inspection would relieve him from the risk of unfair
surprise and would thus in spirit be an exception to the
general rule and a decided improvement over his situation
under common-law procedure. But this would be merely an
accidental result in a given case ; in theory of law he was
inspecting merely that which was in a sense already his own.
The strict and invariable rule, already briefly noted (ante,
§ 1846), in harmony with the rule already examined for
witnesses (ante, § 1856b), was that no inspection in advance
could be demanded of those documents which were to serve
merely as the adversary's own evidence.
''In short, there was in chancery no exception to the broad
principle of the common law that a party is not entitled to
ascertain before trial the tenor of the documentary evidence
which the adversary possesses to support his own case."
(Ibid., § 1857.)
To simplify the matter, most states adopted statutes authorizing law courts to order pretrial inspection of documents.
(Ibid., § 1859.) This state has had such a statute since its
inception (California Practice Act, Stats. 1851, p. 51, § 446).
It was placed in the original Code of Civil Procedure as section 1000 (as it is now) and has at all times read substantially the same. Particular provision is made with respect
to inspection of accounts (Code Civ. Proc., § 454), written
instruments in actions on them (Code Civ. Proc., § 449),
notice to produce a writing (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1938-1939)
and using the subpoena duces tecum (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1985).
With the thought in mind that section 1000 must be liberally construed, I do not think the Legislature intended
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to incorporate the aforementioned bill of discovery limitation.
There is nothing in the language of the section which indicates such a limitation. · Indeed it is to the contrary. It
authorizes inspection by either party of any papers in the
adversary's possession or control containing evidence relating
to the "nwr#s" of the action or a "defense" therein. In
speaking of the penalties suffered if the inspection is refused,
the court may exclude the paper from being given in evidence,
which could apply only to papers in support of the adversary's own case. It then goes on to state the result where
the paper of which inspection is refused is wanted by the
applicant for his own case, thus further indicating that the
inspectable papers are not confined to the applicant's own
case. I agree with Professor Wigmore when he states in
connection with a summary of the inspection statutes of the
various states that "This legislation was plainly animated
by a conviction that the existing principles were defective,
and that, for the reasons already examined (ante, § 1847),
a determined inroad should be made on the sportsman's theory
that the adversary is entitled to keep his own evidence to
himself until the trial." (Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.),
supra, § 1859.) It has been held in other states with statutes
which do not contain the phrases last above discussed, having
only the first sentence like section 1000, that pretrial inspection may be had of papers relevant for use by applicant
even though they were the adversary's own documentary
evidence. (See Looney v. Saltonstall, 212 Mass. 69 [98 N.E.
698] ; Fox v. Derrickson, 7 Boyce (Del.Super.) 129 [104 A.
155] ; Lacoss v. Town of Lebanon, 78 N.H. 413 [101 A. 364] ;
see cases contra collected Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.),
§ 1856b.)
In this state, the cases have not indicated that the limitation
in the bill of discovery existed under section 1000. Some
cases speak of the statutory law as springing from the bill
of discovery or as being based on that principle. (Wright
v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. 469 [73 P. 145] ; Union Trust
Co. v. Sttperior Court, S1tpra, 11 Cal.2d 449; Parker v. Shell
Oil Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 48 [130 P.2d 158].) But none of
them holds that the limitation here discussed is present.
They do speak of the necessity of liberality in allowing inspection. Un,ion Collection Co. v. Sttperior Court, 149 Cal.
790 [87 P. 1035], and Favorite v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.
App. 316 [198 P. 1004], merely hold that a person cannot
by a bill of discovery obtain evidence on a collateral matter
that is not relevant to any of the issues in the case. In
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Reed v. Union Copper M·in. Co., 1 Cal.Unrep. 587, it was
said that a bill of discovery was not proper because
defendant could be required to answer under oath or called
as a witness. .Ex par·te Clarke, 126 Cal. 235 [58 P. 546, 77
Am.St.Rep. 176, 46 L.R.A. 835], holds only that books cannot
be required to be produced unless shown to be material to
some issue. People v. Nields, 70 Cal.App. 191 [232 P. 985],
and Barrington v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 83 Cal.App. HJO
[256 P. 567], dealt with a lack of showing of materiality.
It has been said, without discussion of the point here involved,
that inspection was proper although the documents bore evidence of the adversary's own case. (Avery v. WiUsee, 177
Cal. 484 [171 P. 95], defendant wanted plaintiff's books in
action by plaintiff for attorney's fees and money expended
by plaintiff for defendant.) In Demaree v. Superior Court,
S1tpra, 10 Cal.2d 99, it was held that by subpoena duces
tecum on deposition to perpetuate testimony (which of course
was before trial), in a pending personal injury action against
defendant, an alleged insured, plaintiff, could obtain the
production of any insurance policy covering him because it
could be material in an action against the insurer, if and
when such action was brought, after and if he obtained
judgment against defendant. To the same effect is Superior
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749 [235 P.2d 833].
I conclude, therefore, that the materiality of the papers
included in the inspection order clearly appears and that
they are such that they come under the provisions of section
1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
I would therefore deny the writ as to all documents.

The petition of real party in interest for a rehearing was
denied April 7, 1954. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted. Carter, J.,
filed the following opinion :
GARTER, J.-The petition for rehearing herein calls attention to the fact that the record does not disclose that the photographs in question were taken by an agent of the city.
This is correct. The record does not disclose by whom the
photographs were taken. It is alleged in the affidavits that
the photographs were in the possession of counsel for the
city but there is no showing whatsoever that the photographs
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were taken by anyone on behalf of the city or that they were
acquired by the city in contemplation of litigation arising
out of the accident here involved. Since the burden was on
the petitioner here to show that the photographs were privileged, it is clear that he failed to make such showing. 'rhe
majority opinion is therefore based upon the erroneous assumption that the photographs were taken by an agent of
the city.
Since the decision in this case was filed my attention has
been called to several authorities which support the ruling
of the trial court here but which were not cited in any of
the briefs. 'rhese authorities are Morehouse v. Morehouse,
136 Cal. 332 [68 P. 976], !heel v. Market St. Cable Ry. Co.,
97 Cal. 40 [31 P. 730], Hirshfeld v. Dana, 193 Cal. 142 [223
P. 451], Corcli v. Garcia, 39 Cal.App.2d 189 [102 P.2d 820].
None of these authorities is cited in either the majority or
dissenting opinions and were not considered by the court in
the decision of this case.
In JllcKinley v. Sotdhern Pac. Co., 80 Cal.App.2d 301, 314
[181 P.2d 899], the court said: "The next contention of
appellants Southern Pacific Company and its employees is
that the trial court erred in granting respondents' motion
to compel said appellants to produce written reports of the
accident made by appellants Ahlborn and Shafer (the engineer
and fireman) to their superior. Upon cross-examination of
said appellants respondents brought out the fact that they
had made written reports to B. E. Stone, their superior, and
counsel for respondents thereupon demanded said statements
and moved the court for an order requiring appellants to
produce them, which motion was granted by the court over
the objection of said appellants. Appellants concede that
no prejudice resulted to them from said ruling but urge that
it is a question of some importance and should be determined
by this court. . . .
"In M orehmtse v. Morehouse, 136 Cal. 332, 337 [ 68 P.
976], the court, qtwting from Ex parte Clarke, 126 Cal. 235,
239 [58 P. 546, 77 Am.St.Rep. 176, 46 L.R.A. 835], said:
' [\V] hen a witness is in court . . . and discloses that he
has a paper, document, or book which would be evidence in
favor of the party desiring it, he may, in a proper case, be
rightfully ordered to produce it.' See, also, Freel v. Market
St. Cable Ry. Co., 97 Cal. 40, 44 [31 P. 730] ; Hirshfeld v.
Dana, 193 Cal. 142, 153 [223 P. 451]; Cordi v. Garcia, 39
Cal.App.2d 189, 196 [102 P.2d 820]. And in the latter case
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the court, after citing Morehouse v. Morehouse, sttpra, said
that the right of defendants' attorney to inspect and use
letters in question for impeachment purposes might have
been properly granted.
''Appellants assert that no showing was made in this case
that anything in the requested statements was material to
the issues in the instant case, but it is difficult to understand
how written reports by the engineer and the fireman to their
superior as to the details of the accident could fail to be
material. ·where the engineer and fireman were witnesses
and testified as to such details, and in the course of such
testimony stated that they had made such written reports,
it was, in our opinion, clearly proper for the trial court to
grant respondents' motion to order appellants to produce said
statements for respondents' use in further cross-examination.
If there were statements in said reports inconsistent with the
testimony of the witnesses, respondents were entitled to use
them for impeachment purposes, and if there were no inconsistent statements in said reports, no possible injury could
result to appellants. A trial court must be depended upon
to exercise a wise discretion in such matters to protect a party
from any unnecessary disclosure to others of the contents
of his private books, papers and records, but no party has a
right to refuse to produce any report or document which
may have a bearing upon the facts of the pending litigation.''
The decision in the McKinley case was rendered June 12th,
1947, and a hearing was denied by this court on August 7th,
1947. I respectfully submit that the majority holding in
the case at bar is in direct conflict with all of the above cited
authorities.
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